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A commentary on
What visual illusions tell us about underlying neural mechanisms and observer strategies for
tackling the inverse problem of achromatic perception.
by Blakeslee, B., and McCourt, M. E. (2015). Front. Hum. Neurosci. 9:205. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.
00205
Blakeslee and McCourt state repeatedly that three terms, lightness, brightness, and brightness
contrast, are frequently conflated and/or misused. However, they are apparently unable to give
a single example. Instead, they refer to their own (Blakeslee et al., 2008) experiment in which
they showed that in their replication of Gilchrist et al. (1983), when illumination appeared
homogeneous, lightness and brightness judgments were identical. There is nothing new here. It
is well known. They assert that our subjects, who were instructed to make lightness matches,
were instead making brightness matches. Our subjects were asked to make lightness matches, they
were instructed accordingly, and there is no reason to think that they instead made brightness
matches. In our replication (Jacobsen and Gilchrist, 1988) of an earlier Jameson and Hurvich
(1961) experiment we obtained both lightness and brightness matches. These were qualitatively
different (horizontal vs. diagonal lines). The lightness instructions in the 1988 and 1983 papers
were essentially equivalent.
Blakeslee and McCourt claim that my colleagues and I are not comfortable acknowledging the
fact that when illumination is homogeneous, lightness and brightness collapse to the same thing.
There is no truth to this claim. On page 205 of my book (Gilchrist, 2006) I have written, “Although
brightness models could arguably be ignored in a book on surface lightness, there are several
reasons to include them. First, under homogeneous illumination, lightness and brightness can be
treated as equivalent.”
Blakeslee and McCourt object to my description (2006, p. 6) of brightness as “the perception
of a proximal quality—the raw intensity of some part of the image.” They argue that I am
confusing brightness with luminance, and they stress that brightness matches deviate substantially
from luminance matches. But in a brightness matching task, subjects are instructed to match the
luminance of targets, and they try to match luminance, regardless of accuracy. Likewise we say
that lightness is perceived reflectance, even though we know that lightness matches deviate from
reflectance matches. Brightness is the perception of a proximal quality, even when inaccurate.
However, the central argument made by Blakeslee and McCourt is that my colleagues and I are
ignoring an important distinction between what they call apparent lightness and inferred lightness.
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They contend that when illumination is homogeneous, lightness
is perceived directly whereas when a visible illumination edge is
present, lightness is not seen directly but merely inferred.
They claim that both in my experiments on depth and
lightness (Gilchrist, 1977, 1980) and in our edge substitution
experiments (Gilchrist et al., 1983; Gilchrist, 1988), in those
conditions in which the subjects reported black and white targets,
those targets did not in fact appear black and white, but instead,
the subjects merely inferred that those targets were probably
black and white. This claim, which was first made in the 1970’s
by those defending the simplistic lateral inhibition account of
lightness, is nonsense. In all of these experiments, subjects simply
reported the lightness values as they appeared. Burkamp (1923)
showed that fish correctly respond to the reflectance of a feeding
tray, even when an illumination edge is present. Are these fish
making an inference? Consider Adelson’s well-known checkered
shadow illusion. The very different appearance of the two equi-
luminant targets lying on opposite sides of the illumination edge
cannot be attributed to an inference. It occurs immediately and
unavoidably. That is the point of the illusion.
It is not hard to see why Blakeslee and McCourt would make
such a claim. We have shown that changing the perceived depth
of a target or changing whether an edge is perceived as an
illumination edge or as a reflectance edge can move the perceived
lightness of a target almost from one end of the lightness scale to
the other, with merely a trivial change in the retinal image. Unless
those data can be discredited, the ODOG model cannot account
for lightness perception in most real-world scenes.
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